Individual differences in the calibration of trust in automation by Pop, Vlad Liviu




























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 







































Dr. Francis T. Durso, Advisor 
School of Psychology 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Wendy A. Rogers 
School of Psychology 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Rustin Meyer 
School of Psychology 










 I would like to thank my advisor, Frank Durso, for all the guidance and help he 
provided throughout all of the steps in this process. I would like to thank my committee 
members, Wendy Rogers and Rustin Meyer, for their guidance and invaluable feedback. I 
would like to thank Stephanie Merritt for sharing the x-ray image set used in the Merritt 
and Ilgen (2008) study. Finally, I would like to especially thank Alex Shrewsbury for all 
his help with compiling the image set used as stimuli, programming the experimental 


















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES vi 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS viii 
SUMMARY ix 
CHAPTER 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 




Image Set 12 
Bag Filling Procedure 12 
Measures 14 
Automation Expectancy 14 
Trust and Perceived Reliability 15 
Causal Attribution 15 
Design 16 
Procedure 17 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 19 
Automation Expectancy 19 




Automation Expectancy, Causal Attribution, and Trust 36 
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 38 




LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1: Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the 
perceived reliability data for the control information condition. 23 
Table 2: Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the 
perceived reliability data for the causal information condition. 30 
Table 3: Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the 
perceived reliability data. 42 
Table 4: Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1: An example of how trust can be affected by the feedback loop proposed in 
Mayer et al.’s (1995) integrative trust model. 5 
Figure 2: Individual differences in trust calibration as explained by a feedback loop 
varying based on the locus of control of the causal attribution of errors. 7 
Figure 3: An example of the four different views of one bag. 14 
Figure 4: Frequency distribution of automation expectancy scores. 20 
Figure 5: Perceived reliability in each trial block for the three reliability conditions 
in the current experiment and Wiegmann et al.’s 2001 experiment. 22 
Figure 6: Actual and perceived reliability for each trial block in the 100-80 
reliability condition. 24 
Figure 7: Actual and perceived reliability for each trial block in the 80-80 reliability 
condition. 24 
Figure 8: Actual and perceived reliability for each trial block in the 60-80 reliability 
condition. 26 
Figure 9: Perceived reliability by automation expectancy in the second block for 
each reliability condition in the control information condition. 26 
Figure 10: Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 
control information condition. 28 
Figure 11: Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 
causal attribution information condition. 29 
Figure 12: The significant interaction between automation expectancy and block for 
the causal information condition. The data are averaged across reliability 
conditions.   30 
Figure 13: Trust by automation expectancy averaged over block for each reliability 
condition. 31 
Figure 14: Interaction between automation expectancy and reliability level for the 
current study and Merritt and Ilgen (2008) 32 
Figure 15: Trust scores for each trial block in the control information condition. 34 
Figure 16: Trust scores for each trial block in the causal attribution information 
condition. 35 
Figure 17: Conditions necessary for causal attribution to be considered a mediator. 36 
viii 
 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
df  Degrees of Freedom 
F  F-Statistic 
M  Mean 
Mdn  Median 
n  Sample Size 
p  Pearson  
r  Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient 
R
2
  Coefficient of Determination 
SD  Standard Deviation 
W  Shapiro-Wilk Statistic 
ηp
2
  Partial Eta-Squared 
 
AICP  Automation Induced Complacency Potential 













A large body of research has identified that one of the major factors influencing 
decisions about automation use is operator’s trust. Studies have shown that operator trust 
can be affected by individual differences in expectancy. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate whether operators with an expectancy that automation is trustworthy are 
better at calibrating their trust to changes in the capabilities of the automation. We also 
investigated why this individual difference affects calibration. In a baggage screening 
task 179 participants searched for weapons in 200 x-ray images of luggage. Participants 
were assisted by an automated decision aid exhibiting different levels of reliability. 
Measures of expectancy that automation is trustworthy were used in conjunction with 
subjective measures of trust and of perceived reliability to identify individual differences 
in trust calibration. We found that operators with high expectancy that automation is 
trustworthy were more sensitive to changes (both increases and decreases) in automation 
reliability, and that this difference was caused by attributing errors to the situation rather 










In an effort to reduce human error in complex systems, a variety of automated 
aids aimed at improving diagnostic and decision making processes are being 
implemented (Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). If these automated aids are not 
perfectly reliable, the decision of when to rely on automation and when to perform a task 
manually can greatly influence performance, safety, and profitability. For example, 
Wickens and Dixon (2007) found that in some cases operators relied on automated aids 
even when it resulted in worse diagnostic monitoring than when the operator had not used 
automation at all. When operators rely on automation without recognizing its limitations, 
misuse occurs (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  On the other hand, if operators underutilize 
automation, even though using it would improve their performance, automation disuse 
occurs (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Both automation misuse and disuse are indicators 
of inappropriate reliance, and their consequences can be costly.  
A large body of research has identified that one of the critical variables that may 
influence decisions about automation use is an operator’s trust in the automation (see Lee 
& See, 2004 for a review). Operators tend to use automation that they trust while 
rejecting automation that they do not. For appropriate use to occur, operator trust must 
match the true capabilities of the automation (Lee & See, 2004). The appropriateness of 
trust can be evaluated in terms of its calibration. Calibration is “the correspondence 
between a person’s trust in the automation and the automation’s capabilities” (Lee & See, 
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2004; p. 55). If trust is higher than the system’s capabilities, over-trust occurs, whereas if 
trust is lower than the system capabilities, distrust (under-trust) occurs.   
The calibration of trust can be affected by characteristics of the automation, the 
operator, and the context (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Studies examining how these factors 
individually influence trust include how trust is affected by: automation reliability 
(Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003), automation display content and 
format (Lee & See, 2004), automation errors (Dzindolet et al., 2003; Lee & Moray 1992; 
Wiegmann et al., 2001), task difficulty (Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006), and the 
consequences of misses and false alarms (Keller & Rice, 2010; Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). These studies have identified how individual factors influence trust, however we 
do not fully understand how the dynamic interaction of these factors influences trust.  For 
example, Lee and Moray (1994) found that for some people changes in the capabilities of 
the automation led to a substantial change in trust, yet for others it led to a small change. 
This finding suggests that the relationship between automation characteristics and trust 
may be moderated by individual differences.  
An individual difference that can influence initial trust level, as well as how new 
information and feedback are interpreted is one's expectancy that others can be trusted. In 
1967, Rotter developed a measure assessing trust in parents, teachers, friends, classmates, 
and so on, in order to determine a person's expectancy that others can be trusted. The 
scale was additive such that the greater variety of people that a person trusted, the higher 
that person's general expectancy that people can be trusted. Interestingly, just because an 
individual had a high expectancy that others could be trusted did not mean that the person 
was more gullible (Rotter, 1967; 1971; 1980). In fact, the opposite has been shown to be 
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true: High expectancy individuals trusted others more appropriately (Lee & See, 2004). 
Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) found that when interacting with untrustworthy 
people, high expectancy individuals had lower estimates of trust than low expectancy 
individuals. They also found that high expectancy individuals predicted other’s 
trustworthiness better than low expectancy individuals, and that high expectancy 
individuals were more sensitive to information revealing a lack of trustworthiness in 
others. The same was true in a study summarized by Rotter (1971), in which after a 
confederate told participants that they were being deceived, participants with a high 
expectancy that others could be trusted reported being suspicious whereas participants 
with a low expectancy did not. 
The individual difference of expectancy that others can be trusted originated in 
the interpersonal literature, however studies showing that humans respond socially to 
technology have led to its application in the automation literature (Lee & See, 2004). 
Singh, Molloy, and Parasuraman (1993a) developed an Automation-Induced 
Complacency Potential (AICP) Rating Scale to assess attitudes towards everyday 
automation such as automated teller machines and automotive cruise control. Like 
Rotter's (1967) scale, this scale was also additive, such that a higher score indicated a 
greater variety of automation that a person found trustworthy, reliable, dependable, and 
safe. The scale represents the general tendency or propensity to trust automation and has 
been used as a measure of people's expectancy that automation can be trusted (Lee & See, 
2004; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; Singh et al., 1993a). Some studies have referred to this 
construct as propensity to trust, however that term is somewhat misleading as it implies 
that people with a high propensity to trust always have higher trust in automation, which 
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is not the case. For example, Merritt and Ilgen (2008) found that when using automation 
that was highly reliable (85%), operators with a high AICP score had higher trust 
estimates than operators with a low AICP score, however when using automation that 
was not very reliable (65%) the opposite was true; operators with a high AICP score had 
lower trust estimates than operators with a low AICP score. This finding parallels the 
studies in the interpersonal literature that found when interacting with untrustworthy 
people, high expectancy individuals had lower estimates of trust than low expectancy 
individuals (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Thus we will follow the convention in the 
interpersonal trust literature and refer to the AICP measure as automation expectancy 
rather than propensity to trust (although it represents the same construct).  
The parallel findings of Merritt and Ilgen (2008) and Yamagishi et al. (1999) 
suggest that individual differences in expectancy may be able to account for why changes 
in the capabilities of the automation in previous studies led to a substantial change in trust 
for some, yet for others it only led to a small change. Lee and See (2004) proposed that 
“one possible explanation that merits further investigation is that high [propensity to] 
trust individuals may be better able to adjust their trust to situations in which the 
automation is highly capable as well as to situations in which it is not” (p. 53). This led to 
the first research question explored here: Are operators with high automation expectancy 
better at calibrating their trust to changes in the capabilities of the automation? 
The proposed question has yet to be tested empirically with automation; however, 
the findings of other studies investigating automation expectancy suggest that people 
with high automation expectancy may be better at adjusting their trust to changes in the 
capabilities of the automation. Singh, Molloy, and Parasuraman (1993b) found that 
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people with high automation expectancy had higher detection rates of automation failures 
than people with low automation expectancy. This finding may indicate that people with 
high automation expectancy are more sensitive to information revealing lack of 
trustworthiness, however this cannot be confirmed because trust was not measured in that 
study. Merritt and Ilgen (2008) found that trust estimates of operators with high 
automation expectancy were more sensitive than operators with low expectancy, however 
operators were either paired with a low or high functioning automated aid whose 
capabilities remained constant, so we do not know if this higher sensitivity results in a 
better calibration of trust when the reliability of the automated aid changes.  
Several models of trust development can inform questions of how operators 
calibrate their trust. An integrative model of trust by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 
(1995) proposed that trust develops through a feedback loop, such that after each time a 
trustor takes a risk with a trustee, the trustor evaluates the outcome. Mayer et al. (1995) 
further proposed that the outcome then indirectly influences trust through the trustee’s 
perceptions of several trustor characteristics, including ability. In other words if the 
outcome is positive, prior beliefs about the trustee’s abilities should be reinforced and 
trust should increase, whereas if the outcome is negative, prior beliefs about the trustee’s 
abilities may be reevaluated and trust may decrease . See Figure 1 for an illustration of 
the feedback loop in Mayer et al.’s (1995) model.  
 
 
Figure 1. An example of how trust can be affected by the feedback loop proposed 











Applying Mayer et al.’s (1995) model to the current context would suggest that 
after each time an operator utilizes an automated aid, the operator assesses whether 
trusting the automation led to a correct detection decision. If trusting the automation led 
to a correct decision, operator trust should increase, whereas if it led to an incorrect 
decision, the operator may reevaluate the automation’s abilities and subsequently reduce 
trust. Mayer et al.’s (1995) feedback loop accounts for the evolution of trust over time, 
however it cannot be used to explain the individual differences in trust evolution found in 
previous studies (e.g., Lee & Moray, 1994; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). The explanation for 
individual differences in trust evolution may be related to differences in operator 
perceptions of automation errors. 
A model proposed by Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) combines Mayer et al.’s 
(1995) feedback loop with Weiner’s (1986) causal attribution theory to explain why 
negative outcomes sometimes lead to a decrease in trust and other times do not. 
According to Weiner’s (1986) attribution theory, negative outcomes (such as errors) 
cause individuals to identify the outcome’s cause (e.g., automation ability, luck, task 
difficulty). The locus of causality of this attribution can vary. An individual can attribute 
the cause of an error as either being internal to the automation (i.e., automation ability) or 
external to the automation (i.e., situation). If operators attribute the cause of errors to 
automation ability, Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) model would suggest that these 
operators should withdraw trust, however if operators attribute the cause of errors to 
external factors, the same model would suggest that operator trust may not necessarily 
decline. See Figure 2 for an illustration of how Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) model 




Figure 2. Individual differences in trust calibration as explained by a feedback 
loop varying based on the locus of control of the causal attribution of errors. 
 
Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) developed their model to explain when 
trustworthiness in interpersonal relationships is in need of repair, however their model 
could also be applied to explain why operators with high automation expectancy may be 
better at calibrating their trust. As illustrated in Figure 2, trust is influenced by operator 
perceptions of automation abilities. This is consistent with research on trust in automation 
suggesting that trust calibration is based on the operator’s subjective perceptions of 
automation capabilities and not on the actual capabilities of the automation (Lee & See, 
2004; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; Wiegmann et al., 2001). Merritt and Ilgen (2008) found that 
operator perceptions were affected by individual differences in automation expectancy. 
Specifically, they found that operators with high automation expectancy who were paired 
with lower functioning automation suffered the largest negative effects on perceptions of 
machine characteristics and on trust. The parallel of these findings and Tomlinson and 
Mayer’s (2009) model certainly suggests that operators with high and low automation 
expectancy may differ in their ability to calibrate trust because of differences in the 
causal attribution of automation errors.  
The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether operators with high 
automation expectancy better calibrate their trust to changes in the capabilities of the 









External (Situation, Task, Luck) 
Internal (Automation’s Ability) 
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automation, and if so, why? These questions were tested using a baggage screening task 
in which participants searched for weapons in x-ray images of luggage with assistance 
from an automated decision aid. Both individual differences in automation expectancy 
and subjective measures (trust and perceived reliability) were examined. The first 
question was addressed by investigating individual differences in operators’ level of trust 
in an automated decision aid during trials exhibiting different levels of automation 
reliability. Initially participants screened luggage while using an automated aid that was 
either 60%, 80%, or 100% reliable. The automated aid with an initial reliability of 60% 
increased to 80% reliability whereas the aid with an initial reliability of 100% decreased 
to 80% reliability. The automated aid with an initial reliability of 80% acted as a control, 
and its reliability did not change. Thus, in all conditions automation reliability was 80% 
in the second half of the experiment. The three reliability conditions are identical to the 
ones used by Wiegmann et al. (2001) to investigate the effects of aid reliability on user’s 
trust. Wiegmann et al. found that operators were sensitive to automation reliability levels 
differing by a magnitude of 20%, thus the same conditions were used to investigate 
individual differences. 
 As previously stated, the findings of Merritt and Ilgen (2008) combined with 
Tomilson and Mayer’s (2009) model suggest that operators with high and low automation 
expectancy may differ in their ability to calibrate trust because of differences in the 
causal attribution of automation errors. In order to test why operators with high 
automation expectancy may be better at calibrating their trust, the causal attribution of 
automation errors was manipulated for half of the participants. Previous research 
indicates that an individual’s causal attributions depend upon the nature of available 
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information (Kassin, 1979; Kelley, 1967; Teas & McElroy, 1986). Specifically, three 
types of information are used in attributing causal explanations – consistency (does the 
individual behave similarly across time and situations), consensus (do other individuals in 
the same situation behave similarly), and distinctiveness (does the individual behave this 
way only in certain situations; Kelley, 1967).  
 According to Kelley’s (1967) theory about the causal attribution process, causal 
attributions are based upon particular combinations of the three aforementioned factors 
(Kassin, 1979; Teas & McElroy, 1986). When people are presented with the combination 
of information indicating that a behavior is high in consistency, low in consensus, and 
low in distinctiveness, they will likely attribute the cause to the individual (Kassin, 1979; 
Kelley, 1967; Teas & McElroy, 1986). For example if an educator is trying to determine 
why one of their students failed a test in their class and reviewing the student’s other 
grades in their class indicates that the student has regularly scored poorly (high 
consistency), reviewing the transcript indicates that the student has failed other classes 
(low distinctiveness), and other students in the class performed well on the exam in 
question (low consensus), the educator is likely to blame the student (e.g., poor study 
habits, lack of attention paid in classes, etc). On the other hand, given a combination of 
information indicating that a behavior is high in consistency, high in consensus, and high 
in distinctiveness, people are likely to attribute the cause to the situation (Kassin, 1979; 
Kelley, 1967; Teas & McElroy, 1986). Using the same scenario as before, if reviewing 
the student’s other grades in the class indicates that the student regularly scored well 
(high consistency), reviewing the transcript indicates that the student has done well in 
other classes (high distinctiveness), and other students in the class also performed poorly 
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on exam in question (high consensus), the educator is likely to blame the context (i.e. 
difficult exam). 
 The current study used two information conditions to test the causal attribution 
hypothesis. One condition was a control in which participants did not receive any 
information regarding the consistency, distinctiveness, or consensus of automation errors. 
Providing no such information is fairly typical in studies investigating trust in automated 
decision aids (e.g., Lee & Moray, 1992; 1994; Madhaven et al., 2006; Wiegmann et al., 
2001). The other condition was a manipulation in which participants received a 
combination of information that should result in automation errors being causally 
attributed to the automation’s ability (i.e. high consistency, low distinctiveness, low 
consensus), rather than, for example, the situation or task.  
This manipulation had not been previously used to investigate trust in automation, 
however, the trust literature had certainly identified the contribution of information in the 
development and calibration of trust. As Lee and See (2004) stated: “the availability of 
information at … different levels of detail and attributional abstraction may lead to high 







 Participants were 179 undergraduate students from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology,  89 of which were female and 90 male. The sample was 68.7% White, 3.9% 
Black, 20.9% Asian, and 6.5% other races. The mean age was 19.9 with a standard 
deviation of 1.86. All participants were over the age of 18, had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and reported being knowledgeable about computers and comfortable using 
them. Participants were compensated for their participation by receiving 1.0 course credit 
through Experimetrix.  
Apparatus 
 The study took place in the Cognitive Ergonomics Lab at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology. The task was a medium fidelity X-Ray Screening Task similar to the task 
used in Merritt and Ilgen’s (2008) study
1
. For this task, x-ray images of luggage were 
presented on a monitor. Some of the bags contained weapons, and some did not. 
Participants had to inspect the x-rays and determine if they believed a weapon was 
present and that they would search the bag, or if they believed that the bag did not contain 
a weapon and that they would clear the bag. The slides depicted a weapon 30% of the 
time. This was the same rate used in Merritt and Ilgen (2008) and similar to the rate used 






in other studies investigating trust in automated decision aids (e.g., Dzindolet, Pierce, 
Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001). The difficulty of the slides varied and was largely 
based on the number of items present in each bag. Looking ahead, accuracy on individual 
items ranged from 16% to 100%. Overall accuracy performance ranged from 69.5% to 
97.5%, with a mean of 86.2% and a standard deviation of 5.7%. 
Stimuli 
Image Set   
 The x-ray images of luggage used as stimuli were compiled with items from the 
image set used by Merritt and Ilgen (2008). From this image set we chose 50 types of 
large bags. We did not choose small bags, such as purses and backpacks, because they 
were too small to hold many of the items. Items in the bag were chosen from 10 types of 
clothing, 18 types of knives, 18 types of guns, and 242 various types of other items, 
including electronics (e.g., cell phones, laptops, MP3 players, radios, PDAs, pagers, and 
tape players), organic materials (e.g., papers, books, shoes, wallets, and diapers), and 
metal objects (e.g., tools, toys, keys, and coins). Each bag was standardized at a 
resolution of 768 x 576, displayed on a 30" monitor with a 1024 x 768 resolution. 
Bag Filling Procedure  
 To create each stimulus, a bag number was randomly chosen representing one of 
the 50 large bag types in the image set. The bag was then randomly filled with 2-5 
randomly chosen items of clothing and another 8-20 randomly chosen items. For each 
item, one of the five views was randomly chosen. The orientation of each item was also 
randomly chosen to be either 0, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, or 315°. Finally, each 
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bag was split up into a 4x4 grid, and each item was randomly placed in one of the 16 
resulting quadrants.  
 The bag filling procedure was quite time consuming as it took 20-30 minutes to 
compile each bag depending on the number of items in it. In the interest of time, only 50 
bags were compiled. These 50 bags were repeated four times for the 200 trials in this 
experiment. In order to minimize the chances of participants noticing that the same 50 
bags were repeated four times,  each bag was rotated 180°, flipped horizontally, and 
flipped vertically. Additionally, one of the four views of each bag (original, rotated 180°, 
flipped horizontally, flipped vertically) was randomly chosen to be rotated 90° clockwise. 
See Figure 3 for an example of the four views for each bag. Each bag view was randomly 
assigned to one of four trial blocks. The order of bags within each trial block was 
random, which left only a 0.04% chance that a participant saw the same bag twice in a 
row.  
 In each 100 trial block, 30 bags were randomly chosen for weapon placement. 
This was done so that even if a participant noticed that bags repeated, just because a bag 
did not contain a weapon before did not mean it could not contain one now, and vice 
versa. For example, in Figure 3, one of the four bag variants contains a weapon while 
three do not. For the actual placement of weapons, a randomized block design was used 
to place either a gun or knife in 60 of the 200 images. For both guns and knives, one out 
of the 18 weapon types was randomly chosen. Similarly to the placement of items, one of 
the five views, one of the eight orientations, and one of the 16 placement locations was 




Figure 3.  An example of the four different views of one bag. 
 
 Participants were told that an automated aid, the Automatic Weapons Detector 
(AWD), was available to assist them, however they were not told how reliable it was. The 
reliability of the automated aid was either 60%, 80%, or 100% depending on reliability 
condition. For conditions in which the automated aid was not perfectly reliable, 
automation errors were equally divided between misses and false alarms, and randomly 
assigned to bags.  
Measures 
Automation Expectancy 
 Automation Expectancy was assessed using Singh et al.'s (1993a) Automation-
Induced Complacency Potential Rating Scale.  This scale represents the individual 
difference of expectancy that automation can be trusted (Lee & See, 2004; Merritt & 
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Ilgen, 2008; Singh et al., 1993a) and is the same measure used by Merritt and Ilgen 
(2008; although they referred to it as propensity to trust). In previous research this 
measure has had both high internal consistency (r  > .98) and test-retest reliability (r = 
.90; Singh et al., 1993a).  
 Items in this scale presented the participants with a statement, for example “I 
would rather purchase an item using a computer than have to deal with a sales 
representative on the phone because my order is more likely to be correct using the 
computer.” Participants then rated their response on a five point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Scores on this measure can range from 16 to 80.  
Trust and Perceived Reliability 
 Trust was assessed using a 12 item questionnaire developed by Jian, Bisantz, and 
Drury (2000) to assess trust between people and automation. Example items included “I 
can trust the system” and “The system is dependable.” Participants responded to each 
item using a seven point Likert scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7). 
Additionally, perceived reliability was assessed by having each participant rate the 
reliability of the automated aid on a 100 point scale ranging from 0% - completely 
unreliable, to 100 % - completely reliable (adopted from Wiegmann et al., 2001).  
Causal Attribution 
 Causal attribution of automation errors was assessed using an adaptation of 
Russel’s (1982) Causal Dimension Scale. The Causal Dimension scale assess the locus of 
causality of attribution identified by Weiner (1979) and has high internal reliability (α = 
.87; Russel, 1982). The format of the scale has been modified to reflect the investigation 
of the operator’s causal explanation of automation errors.  
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The scale contained nine items. Participants indicated their opinion on each item 
by circling a number between 1 and 9. For example, “Is the cause something that: 
Reflects an aspect of the automation (9) or Reflects an aspect of the situation (1).”  
Design 
 The experiment was a 2 (information: control, internal attribution) x 3 (reliability-
group: 100%-80%, 60%-80%, 80%-80%) factorial design. Information was a between 
subjects manipulation of the type of information the operators received.  Some operators 
received information indicating the consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness of the 
automated aid’s performance while other operators received no such information. 
Participants were randomly assigned to an information condition.  
Reliability-group was a factor of the three experimental conditions used in this 
study. For the first group, the reliability of the automated aid was 100% for the first half 
of the experiment, and unbeknownst to the operator, was reduced to 80% for the second 
half of the experiment. In the second group, the reliability of the automated aid was 60% 
for the first half of the experiment, and unbeknownst to the operator was increased to 
80% for the second half. The third group was a control in which the automated aid 
remained at 80% reliability for the duration of the experiment. No change occurred in the 
presentation that could signal the change in reliability with the exception of the passage 
of time. Reliability-group was a between subjects manipulation and participants were 







 Each experimental session lasted less than one hour. Participants gave informed 
consent, then completed questionnaires to determine automation expectancy and 
demographic information (e.g., age, sex, and ethnicity). Participants were then given 
instructions that described the task, the weapons, and the procedure to clear or search a 
bag. Participants were instructed to screen the x-ray images of carry-on luggage for 
weapons as fast as they can while still adequately inspecting each bag. After reviewing 
the instructions, participants completed three practice trials during which they screened 
bags without the assistance of the AWD. Participants then received instructions 
describing the AWD. The instructions for the internal attribution information group 
included the following information about the consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness 
of the automated aid’s performance: “The Automated Weapons Detector does not 
perform the same as other automated detectors” (low consensus), “ however its detection 
performance is the same regardless of weapon type” (low distinctiveness), “and it 
consistently provides the same recommendation when scanning the same bag multiple 
times” (high consistency). 
 After participants reviewed the instructions and description, they watched three 
trials demonstrating the AWD’s capabilities to allow them to form a first impression of 
its characteristics. They then rated their initial trust levels in the automation and their 
perceived reliability. Participants screened 200 bags. Trust and perceived reliability were 
assessed twice, after every 100 trials. Causal attribution was assessed after participants 
screened all 200 bags. 
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 The total number of trials in this experiment (200) was the same as other studies 
that had investigated trust in automated decision aids (e.g., Dzindolet et al., 2003; 
Madhaven et al., 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2001). The decision to assess trust and 
perceived reliability every 100 bags was based on Wiegmann et al. (2001), who used the 
same reliability conditions as the current study and also assessed perceived reliability 
every 100 trials. Wiegmann et al. (2001) found that 100 trials per reliability condition 
resulted in a significant difference in participants’ perceived reliability when the two 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Automation Expectancy 
 Automation expectancy scores were computed by reversing the scores for 
negatively phrased items and then adding the scores (1-5) for the 16 non-filler statements. 
Scores could range from 16 to 80, with higher scores indicating higher expectancy of 
automation to be trustworthy, reliable, dependable, and safe. In our sample, automation 
expectancy scores ranged from 44 to 80 and were normally distributed, as confirmed by a 
Shapiro-Wilks test, W (176) = .994, p = .663. See Figure 4 for a histogram of the 
frequency distribution. The mean automation expectancy was 61.40 (SD = 6.20), and the 
median was 61. The average of our sample was slightly higher than those reported in 
previous studies (M = 57.69, Singh et al., 1993a; Mdn = 56, Singh et al., 1993b; Mdn = 
58, Prinzel, Freeman, & Prinzel, 2001; M = 56, Merritt & Ilgen, 2008), which may be 
related to the technologically savvy Georgia Institute of Technology undergraduate 




Figure 4. Frequency distribution of automation expectancy scores. 
 
We found a significant positive correlation between automation expectancy and 
initial perceived reliability, r (174) = .26, p = .001, and no significant correlations 
between automation expectancy and perceived reliability reported after the first 100 
trials, r (174) = .13, p = .075, or second 100 trials, r (174) = -.03, p = .705. The same was 
true for trust, with a significant positive correlation between automation expectancy and 
initial trust, r (174) = .29, p < .001, but no correlations between automation expectancy 
and trust reported after the first 100 trials, r (174) = .09, p = .264 or the second 100 trials, 
r (174) = -.02, p = .819. These results were consistent with Merritt and Ilgen's (2008) 
findings of a significant correlation between automation expectancy and initial trust but 
not post-task trust. Taken together, these findings indicated that the automation 
expectancy scale was a reliable predictor of initial trust in automation. More so, the lack 
of correlations between automation expectancy and post task trust indicated that having 
high expectancy for automation to be trustworthy did not necessarily result in the 




 Data for three participants who were more than three standard deviations from the 
mean were excluded. The perceived reliability data for the remaining 176 participants 
were analyzed using linear regression with repeated measures. Reliability condition (100-
80, 80-80, 60-80), information condition (Control, Causal Attribution), and automation 
expectancy were entered as between subject factors. Trial block was entered as a within 
subjects factor , with 1 representing the perceived reliability estimates reported after 
completing the first 100 trials, and 2 representing the perceived reliability estimates 
reported after completing the second 100 trials. We used partial eta-squared (ηp
2
) as a 
measure of effect size, with .010 indicating a small effect, .059 a medium effect, and .138 
a large effect (Cohen, 1988).  
 Overall, the pattern of data matched Wiegmann et al.'s (2001). As illustrated in 
Figure 5, participants were generally sensitive to different aid reliability levels as well as 
changes in reliability. Our findings also support Wiegmann et al.'s (2001) conclusion that 
trust is lost faster than it is regained, evidenced by the relatively large drop in perceived 
reliability when the aid went from 100% reliable to 80% compared to a much smaller 






Figure 5. Perceived reliability in each trial block for the three reliability conditions in the 
current experiment (left) and Wiegmann et al.’s 2001 experiment (right).  
 
There was a significant three-way interaction between block, reliability condition, 
and information condition, R
2
 = .04, F(2,164) = 3.903, p = .022 , ηp
2
 = .045, as well as a 
significant four-way interaction between automation expectancy, block, reliability 
condition, and information condition, R
2
 = .08 , F(2,164) = 4.149, p = .017, ηp
2
 = .048. 
No other effects were significant (see Table 3 in Appendix A for full results). The 
significant four-way interaction included the significant three-way interaction, thus only 
the four-way is discussed. In order to better understand the significant four-way 
interaction, separate three-way linear regression with repeated measures analyses were 
performed for each information condition. We chose to split the data by information 
condition so that we could first determine the relationship between the variables in the 
control condition and then see how the relationship was affected by the causal attribution 
manipulation.  
In the control information condition there was a significant three-way interaction 
among automation expectancy, reliability condition, and block, R
2
 = .02, F(2,84) = 4.223, 
p = .018 , ηp
2
 = .091, indicating that participants were generally sensitive to different aid 
Block 1           Block 2 Block 1         Block 2 
Current Study: Wiegmann et al. (2001): 
23 
 
reliability levels as well as changes in reliability. No other effects were significant (see 
Table 1). The pattern of this interaction is discussed by reliability condition. 
 
Table 1 
Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze 
the perceived reliability data for the control information condition. 
Effect   Df    F    p  ηp
2 
Automation Expectancy 1,84   .398 .530 .005 
Block 1,84   .020 .888 .000 
Reliability Condition 2,84 1.663 .196 .038 
Exp. * Block 1,84   .189 .665 .002 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. 2,84   .835 .437 .020 
Block * Rel. Cond. 2,84 2.314 .102 .053 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. 2,84 4.223 .018* .091 
* indicates that effect was significant at α =.05. 
 
 
 In the 100-80 reliability condition, there did not appear to be a large effect of 
automation expectancy in the first block. As illustrated in Figure 6, when the automation 
was perfectly reliable, participants had generally well calibrated yet slightly lower 
estimates of reliability, regardless of automation expectancy. When the automation 
dropped to 80% reliable in the second block, participants with a high automation 
expectancy had much lower estimates of reliability than participants with low automation 
expectancy. An additional linear regression with repeated measures analysis revealed that 
the block by automation expectancy interaction was not quite significant, R
2
 = .06, 
F(1,27) = 3.904, p = .058, ηp
2
 = .126, however given the small sample size (n=29) and 




Figure 6. Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 
100-80 reliability condition.  
  
 
 In the 80-80 reliability condition, automation expectancy did not affect perceived 
reliability. A separate two-way linear regression with repeated measures analysis 
revealed no significant results, indicating that perceived reliability did not vary as a 
function of automation expectancy (See Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 





 In the 60-80 reliability condition, automation expectancy did not generally affect 
perceived reliability during the first block. As illustrated in Figure 8, when the 
automation was 60% reliable, participants had generally well calibrated estimates of 
perceived reliability. When the automation increased to 80% reliability in the second 
block, participants with higher automation expectancy had higher and better calibrated 
estimates of reliability than participants with lower automation expectancy. An additional 
two-way linear regression with repeated measures analysis revealed that the block by 
automation expectancy interaction was not quite significant, R
2
 = .02, F(1,28) = 3.133, p 
= .088, ηp
2
 = .101, however once again, given the small sample size (n=30) and relatively 
large effect size, we believed that the effect was truly present. 
 Taken together, the pattern of data in the control information condition indicated 
that higher automation expectancy resulted in better calibrated adjustment when the 
capability of the automation increased, but poorer calibrated adjustment when the 
capability decreased. As illustrated in Figure 9, in the second block, when the actual 
reliability of the automation was 80%, participants with high automation expectancy were 
more poorly calibrated than participants with low automation expectancy if the reliability 
in the previous block was higher (100%), but better calibrated if the reliability in the 




Figure 8. Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 





Figure 9. Perceived reliability by automation expectancy in the second block for 




 The separate three-way analysis for the causal information condition revealed that 
the global four-way interaction was likely caused by the individual differences found in 
the control information condition being eliminated by the causal attribution information 
manipulation. The three-way interaction that was found in the control information 
condition was not significant when attribution biasing information was given, R
2
 = .01, 
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F(2,80) = 2.154, p = .123 , ηp
2
 = .051. In the control information condition, when the 
automation dropped from 100% to 80% reliable in the second block, participants with a 
high automation expectancy had much lower estimates of reliability (see Figure 10). In 
the causal attribution information condition, this was not the case. As illustrated in Figure 
11, participants were relatively equally calibrated in the second block of the 100-80 
reliability condition, regardless of automation expectancy. When the automation went 
from 60% to 80% reliable in the second block, participants in the control information 
condition with higher automation expectancy had higher and better calibrated estimates 
of reliability than participants with lower automation expectancy (see Figure 10). Once 
again, this was not the case in the causal attribution information condition. In fact, block 
2 of the 60-80 reliability condition (illustrated in Figure 11) indicates that the opposite 
may be true, although we once again state that the three-way interaction was not 
significant. 
 The three-way analysis revealed a single significant effect; a two-way interaction 
between automation expectancy and block, R
2
 = .01, F(1,80) = 4.641, p = .034 , ηp
2
 = 
.055 (see Table 2 for full results). In order to understand this interaction (illustrated in 
Figure 12), separate analyses were used to investigate the effect of automation 
expectancy in each block. Automation expectancy was not a significant factor in either 
the first block, R
2
 = .0008, F(1,84) = 1.152, p = .286 , ηp
2
 = .014, or the second block, R
2
 
= .00008, F(1,84) = .189, p = .655 , ηp
2
 = .002, further indicating that perceived 
reliability did not vary based on automation expectancy, and that the causal attribution 











Figure 10. Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 








Figure 11. Actual (dotted) and perceived (solid) reliability for each trial block in the 










Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze 
the perceived reliability data for the causal information condition. 
Effect   Df    F    p  ηp
2 
Automation Expectancy 1,80   .271 .604 .003 
Block 1,80 3.446 .067 .041 
Reliability Condition 2,80 1.549 .219 .037 
Exp. * Block 1,80 4.641 .034* .055 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. 2,80 2.361 .101 .056 
Block * Rel. Cond. 2,80 2.237 .104 .055 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. 2,80 2.154 .123 .051 





Figure 12. The significant interaction between automation expectancy and block 
for the causal information condition. The data are averaged across reliability 




 The trust scale data were analyzed using a linear regression model with repeated 
measures. Reliability condition, information condition, and automation expectancy were 
entered as between subject factors and trial block as a within subjects factor. Once again, 
we used partial eta-squared (ηp
2
) as a measure of effect size, with .010 indicating a small 
effect, .059 a medium effect, and .138 a large effect (Cohen, 1988).  
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 There was a significant interaction between reliability condition and automation 
expectancy, R
2
 = .02, F(2,164) = 3.294, p = .040, ηp
2
 = .039. No other effects were 
significant (see Table 4 in Appendix A for a full results table). The significant interaction, 
illustrated in Figure 13, revealed that trust varied differently as a function of automation 









 In the 100-80 reliability condition, trust in the automated aid was relatively high 
regardless of the operator's automation expectancy. This finding confirms Merritt and 
Ilgen’s (2008) speculation that when automation reliability is close to 100%, the optimal 
utilization strategy is obvious and not driven by individual differences. In the 80-80 
reliability condition, operators with higher automation expectancy trusted the automation 
more than operators with lower automation expectancy. In the 60-80 reliability condition 
the opposite was true; operators with higher automation expectancy trusted the 
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automation less than operators with lower automation expectancy. This pattern matched 
Merritt and Ilgen's (2008) findings that operators with higher automation expectancy 
suffered the largest negative effects on trust when paired with automation that had low 
reliability (see Figure 14). The pattern in the present interaction also matched findings of 
studies in the interpersonal literature that found when interacting with untrustworthy 
people, high expectancy individuals had lower estimates of trust than low expectancy 
individuals (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Taken together, these findings indicate that high 
expectancy individuals are more sensitive that low expectancy individuals in adjusting 
their trust to situations differing in trustworthiness.  
 
 
Figure 14. Interaction between automation expectancy and reliability level for the current 
study (left) and Merritt and Ilgen (2008; right). Note: In the current study trust was 
assessed on a 1 to 7 scale while in Merritt and Ilgen's (2008) study trust was assessed on 
a 1 to 5 scale. 
 
 
 Trust was highly correlated with perceived reliability, r (350) = .77, p < .001, so 
we were surprised that the significant four-way interaction found in the perceived 
reliability data was not significant in the trust data, R
2
 = .08, F(2,164) = 2.023, p = .136, 
ηp
2
 = .024. We looked at the trust data and observed the same patterns as in the perceived 
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reliability data. As illustrated in Figure 15, in the control information condition, operators 
with high automation expectancy were more sensitive than operators with low 
automation expectancy to both increases (60-80, Block 2) and decreases (100-80, Block 
2) in automation reliability. Once again this individual difference diminished in the 
causal attribution information condition (see corresponding blocks in Figure 16). Thus it 
appears as if the same effects are present, however we did not have the power to detect 























Automation Expectancy, Causal Attribution, and Trust 
 In order to investigate the role of causal attribution in the relationship between 
automation expectancy and initial trust, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation analysis 
method was used. This was the same method Dzindolet et al. (2003) used to test if the 
relationship between providing the operator information indicating why an automated aid 
might err and automation reliance was mediated by trust. Figure 17 illustrates the 
necessary conditions that had to be met for causal attribution to be considered a mediator; 
1. A significant relation between automation expectancy and trust (a). 2. A significant 
relation between causal attribution and trust (b). 3. A significant relation between 
automation expectancy and causal attribution (c). 4. The relationship between automation 
expectancy and trust (a) was no longer significant after controlling for causal attribution.  
 
 
Figure 17. Conditions necessary for causal attribution to be considered a mediator. 
 
 The relationships between the automation expectancy, causal attribution, and 
initial trust were investigated using Pearson Correlations on data from the 90 participants 
in the control information condition. Data from the causal information condition were 
excluded to avoid confounding causal attribution with the causal information 
manipulation. There was a significant relationship between automation expectancy and 
trust (path a), r (88) = .26, p = .012, indicating that the more a participant expected 
automation to be trustworthy, the higher their initial trust. The relationship between 
   c                                        b 
                         
                        a 




causal attribution and trust (path b) was marginally significant,  r (88) = .20, p = .059, 
indicating that the more participants attributed errors to the automation, the higher their 
initial trust. Interestingly, we did not find a significant relationship between automation 
expectancy and causal attribution (path c), r (88) = .07, p = .493, suggesting that 
participants attributed errors to the automation, regardless of their automation 
expectancies. The lack of a significant relationship could be related to the factors 
underlying automation expectancy. Automation can be reliable, dependable, and safe, 
regardless of whether errors are attributed as internal or external to the automation. 
Nevertheless, the  lack of a significant relationship between automation expectancy and 
causal attribution violated a necessary condition of the mediation analysis, suggesting 
that causal attributions did not mediate the relationship between automation expectancy 






 The first purpose of the present study was to investigate whether operators with 
high automation expectancy are better at calibrating their trust to changes in the 
capabilities of the automation. The significant three-way interaction for perceived 
reliability in the control information condition indicated that higher automation 
expectancy resulted in better calibrated adjustment when the capability of the automation 
increased, but poorer calibrated adjustment when the capability decreased.  
 The significant interaction between reliability condition and automation 
expectancy for trust scores also indicated that higher automation expectancy resulted in 
higher sensitivity in adjusting trust to situations differing in trustworthiness. These 
findings may explain why previous experiments have sometimes found unstable and non-
linear changes in trust. For example, Lee and Moray (1994) found that introducing errors 
in an automatic controller led to a substantial change in trust for some participants, yet 
little or no change for others. Our results indicate that this was likely due to differences in 
automation expectancy, but why? 
 The second purpose of our study was to investigate why calibration differs as a 
function of automation expectancy. We predicted that this effect was caused by 
differences in the causal attribution of automation errors. Specifically, we hypothesized 
that operators with high automation expectancy attributed errors as internal to the 
automation, leading them to re-evaluate the automation's ability and their trust in the 
automation, while operators with low automation expectancy attributed errors as external 
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to the automation, thus not re-evaluating the automation's ability and their trust in the 
automation. Our results indicated that calibration did indeed differ as a function of 
automation expectancy due to differences in the causal attribution of automation errors. 
  In fact, the three-way interaction for perceived reliability scores in the causal 
information condition indicated that we were able to eliminate the effects of automation 
expectancy by manipulating causal attribution. However, the relationship between 
automation expectancy and causal attribution turned out to be the opposite of what we 
hypothesized. The global four-way interaction for perceived reliability indicated that 
manipulating the attribution of errors as internal to the automation no longer resulted in 
operators with high automation expectancy having better calibrated adjustment when the 
capability of the automation increased or poorer calibrated adjustment when the 
capability decreased. This finding revealed that in the control condition, operators with 
high automation expectancy attributed errors as external to the automation while 
operators with low automation expectancy attributed errors as internal to the automation. 
Taken together, our results indicate that operators with high automation expectancy are 
more sensitive in adjusting trust to situations differing in trustworthiness because they 
attribute errors as external to the automation (e.g., the situation or task).  
 The relationship between automation expectancy, causal attribution locus, and trust 
is not as simple as the model we proposed in the introduction (Figure 2). Trust is a 
multidimensional construct that is based on a variety of factors (Lee & See, 2004). 
Interestingly, the task and situation related reliability of automation has been defined as 
one of the general bases of trust in automation (Lee & Moray, 1992; Lee & See, 2004). 
Studies have shown that appropriate trust depends on understanding the capabilities of 
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automation in different situations (Lee & See, 2004). Operators who attribute automation 
errors to task or situation characteristics foster this understanding and develop more 
appropriate trust, however operators that continuously attribute errors to automation 
characteristics do not. These findings can be used to explain the effects found in our 
study. Operators with high automation expectancy were more sensitive in adjusting their 
trust to changes in automation reliability because their external attribution of errors 
increased their understanding of the automation's capabilities in different situations. 
When causal attribution was manipulated to be internal, operators failed to get an 
understanding of the automation's capabilities in different situations because errors were 
attributed to the automation, thus we observed a decrease in the sensitivity of adjusting 
trust to different situations.   
 The results of our study are also applicable outside of the research community. 
Operators differing in automation expectancy may need different interventions (training) 
or information to successfully calibrate their trust levels. For example, operators with low 
automation expectancy may be given information that leads them to attribute the cause of 
automation errors as external to the automation (i.e. providing information indicating that 
automation behavior is high in consistency, high in consensus, and high in 
distinctiveness). Training programs can also be customized in order for operators with 
low automation expectancy to better understand the capabilities of automation in 
different situations.  
 As Lee and See (2004) stated, "little research has addressed the challenges of 
promoting appropriate trust in the face of a dynamic context that influences its capability" 
(p. 75). Future studies should investigate whether providing information that results in 
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automation errors being causally attributed to the situation (i.e. high consistency, high 
distinctiveness, high consensus) results in operators with low automation expectancy 
having a higher sensitivity in adjusting trust to situations differing in reliability. Future 
studies may also investigate how calibrated adjustment varies as a factor of automation 
expectancy in a wider variety of reliability changes (e.g., automation that goes from 80% 
to 100% reliable, or 80% to 60% reliable).  
 The measurement of automation expectancy should also be examined in future 
studies. Researchers should consider updating items on the nearly 20 year old AICP 
rating scale that are somewhat outdated (e.g., using the automatic programming facility 
on a VCR, manually sorting through card catalogs to find items in a library). Future 
studies could also investigate how updates to the AICP scale impact the reliability of the 
underlying constructs, the internal consistency, and test-retest reliability. The relationship 
between the factors underlying automation expectancy (i.e., confidence, reliance, trust, 
safety) and causal attribution may also be explored. Ultimately, the understanding of 
these factors may lead to the development of a scale that can reliably measure the causal 
attribution of automation errors. This scale could then be used to further investigate how 
individual differences mediate the dynamic interaction of automation and contextual 
factors influencing operator trust. Understanding the dynamics of trust is critical in 
understanding the highly nonlinear patterns of automation reliance, and the first step in 








Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the perceived 
reliability data. 
Effect Df    F    p ηp
2 
Automation Expectancy 1,164 .658 .418 .004 
Block 1,164 1.432 .233 .009 
Reliability Condition 2,164 1.461 .235 .018 
Information Condition 1,164 .049 .826 .000 
Exp. * Block 1,164 2.558 .112 .015 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. 2,164 1.266 .285 .015 
Exp. * Info. Cond. 1,164 .027 .869 .000 
Block * Rel. Cond. 2,164 .355 .702 .004 
Block * Info. Cond. 1,164 .946 .332 .006 
Rel. Cond. * Info. Cond. 2,164 1.264 .285 .015 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. 2,164 2.06 .131 .025 
Exp. * Block * Info. Cond. 1,164 .816 .368 .005 
Block * Rel. Cond * Info. Cond. 2,164 3.903 .022* .045 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. * Info Cond. 2,164 1.28 .281 .015 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. * Info. Cond. 2,164 4.149 .017* .048 




Results of the linear regression with repeated measures used to analyze the trust data. 
Effect Df    F    p ηp
2 
Automation Expectancy 1,164 .000 .983 .000 
Block 1,164 .035 .852 .000 
Reliability Condition 2,164 2.438 .091 .029 
Information Condition 1,164 .100 .752 .001 
Exp. * Block 1,164 .270 .604 .002 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. 2,164 3.294 .040* .039 
Exp. * Info. Cond. 1,164 .146 .702 .001 
Block * Rel. Cond. 2,164 .270 .764 .003 
Block * Info. Cond. 1,164 .015 .904 .000 
Rel. Cond. * Info. Cond. 2,164 .456 .634 .006 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. 2,164 1.818 .166 .022 
Exp. * Block * Info. Cond. 1,164 .004 .952 .000 
Block * Rel. Cond * Info. Cond. 2,164 2.143 .121 .025 
Exp. * Rel. Cond. * Info Cond. 2,164 .533 .588 .006 
Exp. * Block * Rel. Cond. * Info. Cond. 2,164 2.023 .136 .024 
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